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Abstract
Using a large linked employer-employee data set, this paper studies the
relationship between job reallocation, worker reallocation and the flexibility
of wages in western German manufacturing. Using the plant-specific residual
wage dispersion as a proxy for wage flexibility, we find that more flexible
wages are associated with less job reallocation due to demand shocks being
absorbed by wage rather than by quantity adjustments. As to excess worker
reallocation, our results provide evidence of a significant positive relationship
between excess worker flows and residual wage dispersion. Consistent with
the hypothesis that more flexible wages should help employers in dissolving
bad matches, this relationship is found to be most pronounced for low-quality
workers. In interacting our measure of wage flexibility with the degree of plant-
specific employment protection we find that less stringent firing practices may
considerably reduce the need for more flexible wages in order to attain optimal
worker-firm matches.
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Non-technical summary: Using a large linked employer-employee data set,
this paper studies the relationship between job reallocation, worker reallocation and
the flexibility of wages in western German manufacturing. A key aspect of our
study is that we attempt to control for further plant-specific characteristics that
may be expected to affect both wages and employment adjustment. Particular
emphasis is given to plant-specific labour market institutions, such as the existence
of a works council and a collective wage contract, since these institutions are typically
associated with more stringent employment protection and less flexible wages. Using
the plant-specific dispersion of residual wages as a proxy for wage flexibility confirms
this notion, since we find covered plants and those with a works council to be
characterised by less intra-plant wage dispersion.
The key findings that emerge from our study may be summarised as follows:
We document a negative association between plant-specific job destruction rates
and residual wage dispersion, whereas job creation rates are found to be positively
related to wage dispersion. In interacting our measure of wage flexibility with a
proxy for demand shocks, we find that with more flexible wages demand shocks give
rise to less job creation and destruction. These results lend strong support to the
hypothesis put forward by Bertola and Rogerson (1997) who argue that a flexible
wage structure should lead to lower job reallocation rates as demand shocks are
more likely to be absorbed by price rather than by quantity adjustments.
A channel through which wage flexibility may affect excess worker reallocation,
i.e. the amount of worker reallocation over and above the amount that is required
to accommodate job reallocation, has been suggested by the theoretical literature
on job search and matching. This literature generally predicts a negative associa-
tion between wage flexibility and excess separations for those workers who are good
matches, while, at the same time, predicting a positive association for those who
are poor matches. The intuition here is that flexible wages may help employers to
dissolve bad matches or to retain good matches. In relating our measure of residual
wage dispersion to excess worker flows, our results provide evidence of a significant
positive relationship, suggesting that the positive association between wage disper-
sion and excess separations of low-quality workers dominates the negative relation-
ship between residual wage dispersion and excess separations of high-quality workers.
Consistent with the hypothesis that more flexible wages should help employers in
dissolving bad matches, the positive relationship is found to be most pronounced for
low-quality workers. The established positive relationship is robust to the inclusion
of plant-specific labour market institutions, which are typically found to be nega-
tively related to excess worker flows. Finally, in interacting our measure of wage
flexibility with the degree of plant-specific employment protection we find that less
stringent firing practices may considerably reduce the need for more flexible wages
in order to attain optimal worker-firm matches.
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, researchers have devoted considerable attention to the study
of gross job and worker flows. While gross job flows measure the gross creation
and destruction of jobs, gross worker flows refer to all movements of workers into
and out of jobs. The latter may arise as an immediate result of job creation and
destruction or, alternatively, as the consequence of a reevaluation of a job match.
Clearly, identifying the determinants of these two fundamental processes of labour
reallocation is essential to an understanding of labour market dynamics.
A central result that emerges from the empirical literature is that between-firm
heterogeneity in gross job and worker flows, even within narrowly defined industries,
appears to be substantial. As job and worker reallocation1 reflect changes in the
demand and supply of labour, it is natural to think of the flexibility of factor prices
as constituting a key determinant of these flows. The role of wage flexibility for
gross job flows has been taken up theoretically by Bertola and Rogerson (1997) who
argue that a flexible wage structure may lead to lower job reallocation rates. The
basic mechanism at work here is that with flexible wages shocks are more likely to
be absorbed by price rather than quantity adjustments. A channel through which
wage flexibility may affect excess worker reallocation, i.e. the amount of worker
reallocation over and above the amount that is required to accommodate job reallo-
cation, has been suggested by the theoretical literature on job search and matching
(e.g. Burdett 1978, Jovanovic 1979). As discussed below, this literature generally
predicts a negative association between wage flexibility and excess separations for
those workers who are good matches, while, at the same time, predicting a positive
association for those who are poor matches. The intuition here is that flexible wages
may help employers to dissolve bad matches or to retain good matches by allowing
them to adjust wages downwards or upwards.
While much of the empirical work has focused on the cyclical and structural
determinants of gross job and worker flows (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger 1990, 1992,
Anderson and Meyer 1994, Burgess et al. 2000), less work has been done on the
relationship between job and worker reallocation and wage formation. The purpose
of the present paper is therefore to present an empirical analysis of the relationship
between employer-specific wage policies and the extent of job and worker realloca-
tion. Previous empirical research on the role of employer-specific wage policies has
been limited by the availability of detailed micro-data providing both information on
1In what follows, gross job and workers flows and job and worker reallocation will be used
synonymously.
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employer-specific gross job and worker flows and detailed information on individual
wage records as well as worker characteristics.2 Only recently, with the increasing
availability of Linked Employer-Employee data, has the relationship between gross
job and worker flows and wage flexibility received some attention. One of the few
studies in this field has been performed by Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003). Us-
ing a Linked Employer-Employee data set from Slovenia, these authors compute
the employer-specific residual wage dispersion as a proxy for wage flexibility and
explore the relationship between this measure and gross job and worker flow rates.
A similar analysis has been conducted by Tsou and Liu (2005) for Taiwan. The
evidence presented there provides valuable insights into the determinants of job and
worker reallocation by documenting strong correlations between employer-specific
residual wage dispersion and gross job and worker flows. Thus far, similar evidence
for western European economies has been lacking. This is particularly surprising
as these countries are often characterised by labour market institutions that are
widely thought to impose substantial restrictions on both the flexibility of wages
and employment adjustment.
In this paper we present some new evidence on the relationship between employer-
specific wage policies and job and worker reallocation using a large-scale linked
employer-employee data set from Germany, the Linked Employer-Employee Panel
from the German Institute for Employment Research (LIAB). This data set provides
a useful basis for exploring the relationship between wage flexibility and job and
worker reallocation for several reasons. First, the data combine establishment-level
longitudinal data with information on individual wage records and characteristics
for the entire population of workers in the establishment sample. This enables us to
make explicit use of the individual information to calculate year-to-year gross job
and worker flows at the establishment level. Taking advantage of the information on
individual wage records, we proceed to construct a measure of establishment-specific
residual wage dispersion as a proxy for wage flexibility. A second strength of the
data set is that the establishment-level data offer a great deal of information on
establishment characteristics, such as value added, investment expenditures as well
as the nature of industrial relations. The latter permits us to additionally control
for the existence of plant-specific labour market institutions, such as a works coun-
cil or a legally binding collective wage agreement. This is an important aspect of
our study since these labour market institutions are typically associated with more
2This is because much of the empirical work is based upon establishment or company-level data
(see. e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger 1992, Gerlach and Wagner 1993, Konings 1995, Hamermesh et
al. 1996, Blanchflower and Burgess 1996). Burgess et al. (2000) use a Linked Employer-Employee
data set, but do only have access to information on average employers’ wages.
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compressed wage policies, while at the same time providing stricter employment
protection. In the absence of such institutional information it is therefore difficult
to determine to what extent less flexible wages simply reflect more stringent hir-
ing and firing practices or affect job and worker reallocation through their genuine
impact on the employer’s ability to adjust wages.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief the-
oretical discussion of how the extent of wage flexibility may be expected to affect
the magnitude of gross job and worker flows. Section 3 gives an overview of re-
lated empirical work. Section 4 provides some institutional background information
on German labour market institutions that simultaneously affect the extent of em-
ployment protection and the flexibility of wages. Section 5 presents the empirical
analysis. While Section 5.1. to 5.3. provide a description of the data set and a
discussion of the basic measurement concepts, Section 5.4. and 5.5. present the
empirical results. The final Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Wage Flexibility and Job Reallocation
Central to most theoretical explanations of simultaneous job creation and destruc-
tion are allocative shocks either in the form of idiosyncratic cost disturbances (Davis
and Haltiwanger 1990, Hopenhayn 1992), or in the form of demand (Caballero and
Hammour 1994) or productivity shocks (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). With such
shocks providing the main motivation for job reallocation, it is natural to think of
the flexibility of factor prices as constituting a key determinant of these flows. The
fact that a compressed wage structure may lead to higher job reallocation rates has
been extensively discussed by Bertola and Rogerson (1997) who argue that with
less flexible wages shocks are more likely to be absorbed by employment rather than
wage adjustments. Moreover, these authors were the first to notice that distinct fea-
tures of labour market institutions, such as stricter employment protection and wage
compression, may give rise to countervailing effects on job reallocation. In looking
for an explanation of strikingly similar job reallocation rates across countries with
very different employment protection policies, the authors point to the stylised fact
that labour market institutions providing stricter employment protection are gener-
ally associated with more compressed wage policies. As employment protection has
been typically shown to have a negative effect on job reallocation (e.g. Bentolila
3
and Bertola 1990), this may help to rationalise why job reallocation rates do not
vary that much across countries with different labour market institutions.
2.2 Wage Flexibility and Excess Worker Reallocation
In the theoretical literature on job search and matching, imperfect information pro-
vides the main theoretical motivation for explaining the extent of excess worker
reallocation. At the heart of this approach is the notion that the quality of a match
between a firm and its workers is ex-ante uncertain and may be thought of as an
experience good which is revealed over time with the accumulation of tenure (Jo-
vanovic 1979). As long as wages may be seen as a good proxy for the value of the
match, the Jovanovic learning model predicts a negative relationship between wages
and excess worker reallocation. The reason is that good matches are maintained
and bad matches are dissolved by lowering the wages of bad matches down to a
level at which they quit. This, in turn, entails a negative association between wage
flexibility and excess separations for those workers who are good matches, while,
at the same time, predicting a positive association for those who are poor matches.
The reason is that firms with a more flexible wage structure will be able to retain
good matches by adjusting their wages upwards. This becomes particularly relevant
if one allows for on-the-job search permitting workers to search for better paid jobs
as in Burdett (1978). Conversely, if a more flexible wage structure helps firms to
cut the wages of bad matches, this should lead to higher excess separation rates of
low-quality workers.
While the Jovanovic learning model emphasises the relationship between the
extent of wage flexibility and workers’ quit behaviour, it is equally natural to consider
the impact of wages on the hiring practices of employers. In combining the Jovanovic
model with features of the matching model of Pissarides (1985), Pries and Rogerson
(2005) suggest such a channel through which wage flexibility may affect employers’
hiring behaviour. They develop a matching model in which employers receive a
signal about the match’s true quality and in which matches are formed only when
the signal exceeds a threshold value. The authors argue that their model may
help to explain the negative effect of minimum wage regulations on the extent of
hiring through its impact on the minimum required match quality. In terms of
excess worker reallocation, their model is therefore to be interpreted as predicting a
positive relationship between wage flexibility and excess hiring. The intuition here
is that a flexible wage structure may induce firms to become less selective to whom
they hire and may therefore entail more excess turnover for a given created job. In
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addition to analysing minimum wages, the authors also explore the effect of various
other policies, such as dismissal costs on hiring behaviour. As with minimum wages,
stricter firing regulations are shown to reduce the extent of hiring. The underlying
intuition here is that firms become more selective in hiring new workers if it becomes
more expensive to terminate a match.
Taken together, the overall view that emerges from the theoretical literature is
that wage compression and stricter employment protection policies may be expected
to have an offsetting impact on job flows, whereas the effects on excess worker flows
tend to go into the same direction. An exception are separations of workers who are
good matches, because for this group one might expect wage compression to have
a positive impact on excess separations. As a consequence, any empirical analysis
that attempts to quantify the impact of wage flexibility on the extent of gross job
and worker flows needs to carefully disentangle its genuine impact on these flows
from institutional determinants that may be correlated with specific wage policies.
In terms of a multivariate regression framework, this suggests that in addition to
measures of wage flexibility further institutional determinants simultaneously affect-
ing wage formation and the extent of employment protection should be accounted
for.
3 Related Empirical Literature
In the past decades, there has been a great deal of empirical work that has set out
to characterise the empirical properties of gross job flows. The pioneering studies
in this field were performed by Dunne et al. (1989) and Davis and Haltiwanger
(1990, 1992), who exploited large datasets on U.S. manufacturing plants. Since
then, several such analyses have appeared for other countries, such as those by Boeri
and Cramer (1992) for Germany, Leonard and van Audenrode (1993) for Belgium,
Konings (1995) as well as Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) for the UK. A principal
finding that emerges from this literature is that job flow rates are substantial -
ranging from 10 to 20 per cent - and that job creation and destruction typically
occur simultaneously even within narrowly defined industries.
With the increasing availability of detailed micro data, a closely related literature
has studied the determinants of worker flows and has attempted to quantify the
relation among gross job and worker flows. Examples are the studies by Anderson
and Meyer (1994), Hamermesh et al. (1996), Albaek and Soerensen (1998), Abowd
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et al. (1999a) as well as Burgess et al. (2000). A key finding from this literature is
that job reallocation accounts for a substantial fraction of worker reallocation. This
proportion typically ranges from 30 to 50 per cent, indicating that the rate at which
employment positions are reallocated provides one of the major reasons for workers
changing employers or entering unemployment. As with gross job flows, much of
this work demonstrates that the amount of worker and excess worker flows varies
greatly among employers. The impressive magnitude of between-firm heterogeneity
has led researchers to inquire into the structural determinants of gross job and worker
flows. One of the well documented empirical patterns is that the amount of gross job
and worker flows generally declines with firm size and age and appears to be more
pervasive in the non-manufacturing as compared to manufacturing industries. A
further well documented empirical regularity is the importance of the idiosyncratic
component in job and worker reallocation. For example, Burgess et al. (2000)
find employer-specific fixed effects to account for over 50 percent in the variation of
excess worker flows. Moreover, in examining the sources of the time variation of job
reallocation, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) show that employer-specific time-variant
effects account for the largest fraction of the cyclical behaviour of gross job flows.
The widely established importance of employer-specific effects in explaining the
level and time variation of job and worker flow rates indicates that either differ-
ent firms face different circumstances and/or respond differently to similar shocks.
This immediately raises the question of the role of employer-specific wage policies,
allowing firms to respond differently to a change in their economic environment.
Even though wage policies have been recognised as a potential source of between-
employer heterogeneity (Burgess et al. 2000, Davis et al. 2006), very few empirical
studies have addressed the relationship between the extent of wage flexibility and
gross job and worker flows. Some indirect evidence is provided by cross-country
studies that exploit international variations in labour market institutions in order
to examine their impact on job and worker reallocation. Examples are the studies
by Salvanes (1997) and Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004), who look at the relationship
between job flows and European labour market institutions. Controlling for different
degrees in the tightness of employment protection the authors find countries with
more coordinated wage bargaining systems exhibit lower job reallocation rates. As
more centralised wage determination is typically associated with a more compressed
wage structure3, the Bertola-Rogerson hypothesis therefore does not appear to re-
ceive much support from this cross-country evidence. Further indirect evidence is
provided by establishment-level studies that look at establishment-specific institu-
3See e.g. Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), Blau and Kahn (1996), Kahn (1998).
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tional determinants of plant-level gross job and worker flows. Using data from the
Workplace and Industrial Relations Survey, Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) ex-
plore the plant-specific determinants of job reallocation in Britain. While providing
some descriptive evidence of a negative association between union recognition and
the amount of job reallocation, the authors fail to detect any significant relation-
ship between these variables in a multivariate regression framework. Note that this
finding may be consistent with the Bertola-Rogerson view of countervailing effects
of labour market institutions on gross job flows. Using panel data from the Italian
metal sector, Lucifora (1998) finds plant-specific union density to be negatively as-
sociated with separation rates. He concludes that a possible explanation may relate
to the unions’ ability to raise wages above the competitive level. However, due to
a lack of information on individual wages, the study does not separate the unions’
impact on wage formation from other channels through which unions may affect
worker separations.
Far fewer studies have attempted to measure wage flexibility and its impact on
gross job and worker flows directly. Using establishment-level data from Sweden,
Heyman (2001) measures wage flexibility by calculating the industry-specific vari-
ability in average establishment wages. Consistent with the Bertola and Rogerson
hypothesis, he finds industry-specific job reallocation to be negatively related to
the industry-specific dispersion in wages. Yet, it is clear that his measure of wage
flexibility is not able to account for differences in observable worker and employer
characteristics that may explain part of the variation in establishment-level wages.
The study that is closest to our analysis is that by Haltiwanger and Vodopivec
(2003), who use a linked employer-employee data set from Slovenia and look at the
relationship between firm-specific wage dispersion and gross job and worker flow
rates. After controlling for differences in observable worker characteristics, the au-
thors find firm-specific wage dispersion to be negatively related to job reallocation
and positively related to excess worker reallocation. A similar study has been per-
formed by Tsou and Liu (2005) for Taiwan who find a negative association between
firm-specific wage dispersion and job as well as worker reallocation. A drawback
of these studies is that they do not control for other firm-specific characteristics,
which are likely to simultaneously affect the degree of wage dispersion and turnover,
such as the composition of the workforce and firm size. As noted earlier, in the
German case a particularly relevant factor are plant-specific labour market institu-
tions, which may have a simultaneous impact on wage formation and employment
adjustment. In the next section we therefore provide some background information
on German labour market institutions which we consider relevant in this context.
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4 Institutional Background
4.1 Dismissal protection legislation
In Germany, protection against unfair dismissals is provided by the Protection
against Dismissal Act (Ku¨ndigungsschutzgesetz) which applies to establishments
employing a certain minimum number of workers. Over the last decade, the thresh-
old for applicability has changed several times, from 5 to 10 workers in October 1996,
back to 5 workers in January 1999 and then back again to 10 workers in January
2004.4 Establishments which operate below this threshold may dismiss any worker as
long as the less restrictive requirements of the German Civil Code (BGB) are met.5
According to the more stringent employment protection provisions of the Protec-
tion against Dismissal Act, dismissals are justified in three cases only: first, in case
of personal misconduct, second, as a result of the operational requirements of the
employer, and, third, in case of personal incapability or illness. Establishments are
also required to inform the works council where such worker representation exists.
Consultation with the works council is mandatory for both individual and collective
redundancies. The latter generally require the negotiation of a ’social plan’ with
the works council. Such a plan may, for example, stipulate severance payments and
the selection of employees who are laid off (see Section 4.3). Severance payments
may also result from settlements after individual dismissals out of or at the Labour
Court - either because employers are not able to prove that the requirements for a
legal dismissal are met or because they want to prevent workers from suing them at
Court.6
4.2 Collective bargaining agreements
As in many other European countries, German wage determination is dominated by
collective bargaining agreements. Such collective contracts are generally negotiated
between industry-specific trade unions and employers’ associations. While legally
binding on all member firms of the employers’ association and on all employees who
4The threshold refers to fulltime-equivalent employees. Workers employed on fixed-term con-
tracts, other marginal workers and apprentices are generally excluded from this definition. See e.g.
Bauer et al. (2007) who provide an analysis of the effects of this change in employment protection
legislation on worker reallocation.
5An exception is if the establishment is subject to a collective bargaining contract which stip-
ulates special dismissal protection provisions. See also Section 4.2.
6For a more extensive discussion on dismissal protection legislation, see e.g. Schmidt and Weiss
(2000).
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are members of the trade union, member firms generally extend the wage settle-
ment to the non-unionised labour force as well. The decision to join an employers’
association and to apply such a centralised agreement is generally left to the firms’
discretion. An exception is if an agreement is declared to be generally binding by
the Federal Ministry of Labour in which case centralised wage contracts may also
apply to non-member firms and their employees. Further, there are voluntary exten-
sion mechanisms, i.e. firms without any legally binding agreement may voluntarily
apply a centralised industry agreement. Finally, a minor fraction of non-member
firms are engaged in bilateral negotiations with a trade union and conclude firm-
specific agreements. Even though the proportion of covered establishments has been
steadily declining over the last decade7, collective bargaining is still of considerable
importance to the wage-setting process. For example, in 2004 collective contracts
were estimated to cover 61 per cent of employees in western Germany (Addison et
al. 2006a).
The predominance of collective bargaining agreements immediately raises the
question as to how such contracts leave sufficient room for firm-specific wage poli-
cies. In fact, the past two decades have seen a clear tendency even within cen-
tralised wage agreements towards more flexible wage-setting at the firm level since
contractual opt-out or hardship clauses have become a widespread element of such
agreements. While opt-out clauses delegate issues that are usually specified in the
central agreement, such as working-time and pay-conditions, to the plant level, hard-
ship clauses enable firms to be exempted from the centralised agreement if they are
close to bankruptcy. Moreover, since bargained wages in centralised agreements
merely represent a lower bound for wages, there is also sufficient scope for upward
flexibility which is reflected in a major fraction of covered firms paying wages above
the collectively agreed rates. Taken together, then, the institutional setting indi-
cates that even under centralised agreements there ought to be sufficient scope for
firm-specific wage policies. The question of whether this potential has really been
exploited is ultimately an empirical one. Based on the same data that are used in
this study, recent evidence suggests that collective wage contracts appear to sup-
press the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions (Guertzgen
2005). Empirical studies dealing with the impact of collective bargaining on the re-
turns to individual attributes support the notion that unions compress the returns
to individual attributes and tend to raise wages particularly for those workers with
7According to the IAB-Establishment Panel the proportion of establishments subject to an
industry-wide agreement fell economy-wide from 48 per cent to 41 per cent over the time period
1996 to 2004, whereas the decline was from 10 per cent to 2 per cent for firm-specific contracts.
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low observed skills (Stephan and Gerlach 2005 and Fitzenberger et al. 2007). In this
regard, research based on longitudinal data has shown that this induces employers
to hire the most productive workers from those with low observed skills (Guertzgen
2006).
While collective bargaining agreements primarily affect wage determination, they
may also play a certain role in employment protection. A number of collective
bargaining agreements include special dismissal protection provisions, such as more
stringent notice periods than those provided by the German Civil Code or the overall
exclusion of regular dismissals for certain groups of employees. The criteria defining
who these provisions apply to generally relate to age and tenure. It is important to
note that these regulations have priority over other statutory dismissal protection
measures as discussed in Section 4.1.
4.3 Works councils
In Germany, works councils provide workers with the opportunity of employee rep-
resentation at the establishment level. While being legally mandatory in all estab-
lishments with at least 5 employees, a local worker representation of this kind only
takes institutional form if workers initiate a works council election. The participa-
tion rights are laid down under the German Works Constitution Act (Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz) and include information, consultation and co-determination rights,
which generally increase in scope the larger the establishment becomes. These rights
concern a variety of aspects such as working hours and overtime regulations, health
and safety matters, dismissal and hiring decisions as well as the remuneration of
employees. Clearly, the latter two issues are those that are most relevant to our
analysis.
Particularly with respect to employment protection, works councils are known to
have a rather strong position in limiting employers’ discretionary hiring and firing
powers. According to Section 102 of the Works Constitution Act, any dismissal
requires prior consultations with the works council who enjoys the right to object
to the dismissal. If such a formal objection is lodged, the respective workers may
stay employed until a settlement has been reached out of or at the Labour Court.
In case of collective dismissals, works councils may object to the dismissal if they
consider the criteria for the selection of dismissed employees to be inappropriate.
Especially with regard to quits the works council’s impact may not only stem from its
direct participation rights but may also work through its collective voice function,
enabling workers to express discontent. Finally, works councils’ co-determination
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rights are not restricted to dismissals but also extend to hiring decisions as Section
99 of the Works Constitution Act provides works councils in establishments with
at least 20 employees with the opportunity to formally object to the recruitment of
new employees. While these considerations together predict works councils to have
a strong negative effect on job and worker reallocation, the empirical evidence is
somewhat inconclusive. Previous studies have primarily focused on works councils’
effects on worker reallocation, rather than job and excess worker reallocation. These
studies generally document a negative effect on separations, whereas the evidence
on hirings is rather mixed (see Frick 1996, Backes-Gellner et al. 1997, Addison et
al. 2001).
As to wages, according to the dual nature of the German system of industrial
relations works councils are formally prohibited from negotiating over issues that
are normally dealt with in collective bargaining agreements. Yet, despite this legal
ban they are widely recognised to have a substantial impact on wages for at least
two reasons. The first stems from works councils being traditionally involved in
the implementation of collective bargaining agreements at the establishment level.
Along with their consent right with respect to the placement of workers in certain
wage groups works councils are therefore likely to be actively engaged in wage set-
ting. Second, the payment of wages above the collectively agreed rate may also
be expected to result from the local bargaining between works councils and the
management. Consistent with these ideas, a large number of empirical studies have
documented a significant impact of works councils on the level and the structure of
wages. A key finding that emerges from this literature is that works councils appear
to raise the level of wages (see e.g. Addison et al. 1997, Hu¨bler and Jirjahn 2003)
and tend to compress the wage structure by raising wages particularly at the lower
part of the wage distribution (Addison et al. 2006b).
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Data
The data used in this paper are taken from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee
Panel (LIAB) which combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the Em-
ployment Statistics Register. The IAB-Establishment Panel is based on an annual
survey of western German establishments administered since 1993 by the research
institute of the Federal Employment Services in Nuremberg. Eastern German estab-
lishments entered the panel in 1996. The sampling frame encompasses all German
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establishments that employ at least one employee paying social security contribu-
tions. New establishments are added to the survey every year to incorporate births
and to correct for panel mortality and exits in order to preserve the panel’s represen-
tative character. The survey provides a great deal of information on establishment
structure and performance, such as sales, the share of materials in sales, investment
expenditures as well as information on industrial relations, such as the existence of
a works council or a legally binding collective wage agreement (see e.g. Bellmann et
al. 2002).
The second data source is the Employment Statistics Register, which is an admin-
istrative data set based on reports from employers in compliance with the notifying
procedure for the German social security system (see e.g. Bender et al. 2000). This
procedure obliges employers to provide a notification at the beginning and the end
of each employment relationship for all employees who are covered by the German
social security system. In addition, there is at least one annual compulsory noti-
fication on the 31st December of each year. The notifications provide individual
information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, nationality, employment status
(blue/white-collar, part/fulltime, apprentice), educational status (six categories)8
and on the date of entry into the establishment.
The data set is constructed in two steps: First, we select establishments from the
establishment panel data set. From the available waves, we use the years 1995 to
2004. Since information on a number of variables, such as investment expenditures
and sales are gathered retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information
on the last year. Moreover, we restrict our sample to establishments in western
Germany from the mining and manufacturing sector with at least two employees.
In order to be able to compute gross job and worker flows, only establishments with
consistent information on the establishment characteristics of interest and at least
two consecutive annual time series observations are included in our sample. From
the establishment level data we gain information on a number of establishment char-
acteristics, which are likely to impact upon gross job and worker flows. In line with
the empirical literature, these include establishment size, establishment age and a
dummy variable indicating whether the establishment is part of a single plant or a
multi-plant enterprise. To capture institutional differences, we further retrieve infor-
mation on the existence of a works council and a legally binding collective bargaining
8The categories are: No degree, vocational training degree, highschool degree (Abitur), high-
school degree and vocational training, technical college degree and university degree. Missing
and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described
in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that
individuals cannot lose their educational degrees.
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contract. We also construct a measure of value added and the capital-labour-ratio
in order to control for demand shocks and differences in production technologies.
Table A1 in the appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of the
establishment variables.
In a second step, the establishment data are merged with the individual data
using a unique establishment identifier which is available from the establishment
and worker data. The currently available version of the data allows us to merge
the selected establishment data with notifications for all those employment spells
comprising the June 30th of each year. Since the focus of our analysis is on gross
job and worker flows pertaining to standard core employment relationships we ex-
clude observations for homeworkers from the individual data. Moreover, for those
workers who have multiple employers we include only the employment relationship
with the dominant employer.9 The resulting sample comprises 898,111 individu-
als in 1,639 establishments with a total of 5,867 establishment observations and
3,017,246 individual observations. We exploit the individual information to calcu-
late establishment-specific means of individual attributes, which may be expected to
have an impact upon job and worker flow rates. These include the share of females,
part time workers, apprentices, skill groups as well as the median age and tenure of
the workforce. Table A2 in the appendix contains a description of the establishment
means of individual characteristics gained from the Employment Statistics Register.
Finally, Table A3 provides a summary of descriptive statistics of the establishment
covariates.
Further, we make explicit use of the individual information to calculate annual
gross job and worker flows at the establishment level. To do so, we proceed as
follows. Given the structure of the matched worker-firm data, the number of jobs in
establishment j at time t is defined as the number of employment spells comprising
the June 30th in year t. A worker accession in establishment j in period t is defined
as an employment relationship which is observed at June 30th in period t but not in
year t− 1 (at the same point-in-time). Similarly, a worker separation at time t is an
employment relationship observed at t−1 but not in period t. From these definitions
it becomes clear that gross job and worker flows cannot be calculated for the first
time-series observation of an establishment in the panel. Note that recovering the
worker and job flow measures from the individual data is a particular strength of our
9This exclusion affects less than 1 per cent of all observations. The dominant employer is
inferred from the maximum amount of daily earnings. We also exclude marginal employment
relationships (those with earnings below a certain threshold value), since these are included in
Employment Statistics Register only from 1999 onwards.
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data set. The first advantage is that due to its administrative nature the Employment
Statistics Register offers very reliable information on the number of spells at the
relevant point-in-time. Second, and more importantly, the individual data enable us
to gain individual-specific job and worker flow measures. This provides us with the
opportunity to explore whether the hypothesised relationship between excess worker
reallocation and wage flexibility varies with the quality of the match.
However, the data offer some other clear disadvantages as well. First, establish-
ments may enter and exit the IAB-Establishment Panel in each time period, and
the data do not allow a distinction between panel attrition and the death of estab-
lishments and between establishments entering the panel and the birth of plants,
respectively. As a result, we are not able to identify accessions due to births and
separations due to deaths of establishments. Thus, the measures of gross job and
worker flows described below will relate to job and worker reallocation in surviv-
ing establishments that are observed for a least two consecutive years in the panel.
Second, since the establishment data are linked with employment spells comprising
June 30th in a particular year t, the data do not include spells that begin after June
30th in year t−1 and dissolve before June 30th in year t. As a result, we are not able
to calculate measures of within-year job and worker reallocation and, therefore, have
to confine the analysis to year-to-year job and worker flows.10 A final disadvantage
of the data set is that the Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit information
on why an employment relationship has been terminated. As a consequence, the
data do not permit a separate analysis of employer initiated separations (dismissals)
and employee initiated separations (quits).
5.2 Definition of Job and Worker Flow Rates
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), job flow rates for any given establishment
are defined as follows. The year-to-year net job growth rate in establishment j is
JGRjt =
Xjt −Xjt−1
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
, (1)
where Xjt and Xjt−1 measure the stock of employment at June 30th in year t
and t− 1. Correspondingly, the year-to-year job creation rate in establishment j is
10An alternative version of the LIAB data merges the IAB-Establishment Panel with individ-
ual employment histories including also spells beginning after and dissolving before June 30th.
However, this version of the data is restricted to a subset of establishments that are surveyed con-
tinuously from 1999-2001 or from 2000-2002. In order to be able to consider a longer time-period
and to include as many establishments in our analysis as possible, we deliberately make use of the
above described version of the data.
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JCRjt = max(0,
Xjt −Xjt−1
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
), (2)
whereas the year-to-year job destruction rate is given by
JDRjt = max(0,
Xjt−1 −Xjt
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
). (3)
The job reallocation rate for any establishment is given by the absolute value of
either JCRjt or JDRjt :
JRRjt =
∣∣∣∣ Xjt −Xjt−1(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
∣∣∣∣ (4)
Similarly, the gross job creation rate within a particular sector s (such as an
industry or size class) is defined as the sum over all employment gains in sector s,
divided by average sector size, where the latter is given by (Xst+Xst−1)/2. The job
destruction rate within sector s is obtained by totalling all job losses and dividing
by average sector size. Sector-specific job-creation rates are therefore size-weighted
averages of growth rates among establishments where employment is increasing,
while sector-specific job-destruction rates are size-weighted averages of growth rates
among establishments where employment is falling. The job reallocation rate in
sector s is defined as the sum of its job creation and destruction rate, measuring the
rate at which employment positions are reallocated across establishments in a par-
ticular sector. Note that the job reallocation rate represents an upper bound on the
worker flow rate required to accommodate the reallocation of employment positions
within a particular sector s. Similarly, a lower bound is given by max[JDR, JCR]
taking into account that job losers may directly switch to new jobs at expanding
establishments (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992).
Following Burgess et al. (2000) worker accessions and separation rates in estab-
lishment j are defined as
ACCRjt =
ACCjt
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
and SEPRjt =
SEPjt
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
(5)
where ACCjt and SEPjt denote the number of accessions and separations at the
establishment level as defined earlier. The worker flow rate is the sum of the hiring
and separation rate
WFRjt =
ACCjt + SEPjt
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
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and the excess worker flow rate is the amount of worker flows in excess of job
reallocation, i.e. worker flows in excess of the amount that is required to accomplish
an establishment’s growth or decline:
EXWFRjt =
WFRjt − JRRjt
(Xjt +Xjt−1)/2
. (6)
Sector-specific rates (e.g. by industry or size class) are defined analogously to the
sector-specific job reallocation rates described above. Note that if the job and worker
flow measures are aggregated over all individual characteristics at an establishment
j, the difference between hiring and separations must be equal to the change in
employment, i.e.
ACCjt − SEPjt = Xjt −Xjt−1. (7)
This definition of job flows reflects the standard concept in the literature in
defining jobs flows as the net change in employment at an establishment j. This is
based upon the notion of a job as a worker-employer match and therefore relates
job flows to the change in the number of such matches.11
5.3 A Measure of Firm-Specific Wage Flexibility
Following Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003), wage flexibility will be proxied by
plant-specific residual wage dispersion. This measure is intended to capture that
part of the within-plant variability in wages that may not be explained by differ-
ences in observable characteristics. Based upon the notion that excess separations
and accessions depend critically on the employer’s ability to pay wages that devi-
ate from the average employer-specific wage premium, one might argue that this
measure of wage dispersion is well suited for explaining the heterogeneity in excess
worker flows. Yet, in explaining the heterogeneity in job flows such a cross-sectional
measure is certainly open to several criticisms, with the most important one be-
ing that it fails to capture any dynamic dimension of wage flexibility. Ideally, one
would like to obtain a measure that reflects the extent to which wages respond
to changes in economic conditions, such as demand or productivity shocks. Even
11As noted by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Burgess et al. (2000), an alternative view would
be to associate a job with a particular employment position or skill-level. Thus, the replacement of
a job of one particular skill-type with another skill-type could equally be referred to as job creation
and destruction. This alternative view of job reallocation could be accounted for by skill-specific
measures of job flows. However, eq. (7) need not necessarily hold in this case, since a change
in the skill configuration at establishment j may either be accomplished by external accessions
and separations or, alternatively, by internal accessions and separations that occur through skill-
upgrading or downgrading (see e.g. Abowd et al. (1999a) and Bauer and Bender (2004) for such
a skill-specific analysis).
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though our data set offers information on value added as a proxy for such shocks, it
presents us with severe difficulties in obtaining such a dynamic measure that varies
across plants. The reason is that any employer-specific measure would involve plant-
specific regressions of wages on a measure of time-specific shocks, which requires a
sufficient number of establishments which can be tracked over a longer time period.
Since in our data set the average number of time-series observations is about 3.6,
we resort to the plant-specific dispersion of residual wages to explain both worker
and job reallocation.12 However, later on we will interact this measure with a proxy
for demand shocks in order to examine whether establishments with a more dis-
persed wage structure respond differently to these shocks than those with a more
compressed wage structure.
To construct the measure of residual wage dispersion, we proceed as follows.
First, we estimate an individual wage equation taking the following form:
lnwageit = µ+ β · x′it + δ · u′i + η · w′jt + ρ · q′j + αi + φj + ²ijt, (8)
with i = 1,..., N individuals and a total of N∗ =
∑
Ti total worker-year obser-
vations. j refers to the establishment which employs individual i at time t, i.e. we
have j = j(i, t), with j = 1, ..., J. The dependent variable, lnwageit, is the indi-
vidual log daily wage. The explanatory variables consist of a vector of time-varying
individual covariates, x′it, with a coefficient vector β, a vector of individual time-
constant characteristics, u′i with a coefficient vector δ, and vectors of time-varying
and time-constant j−level covariates, w′jt and q′j, with coefficient vectors η and ρ.
Time dummies are included to capture common macroeconomic effects. Finally, αi
represents an individual unobserved effect, φj denotes establishment-specific unob-
served heterogeneity, and ²ijt represents a time-specific error term.
To account for individual and establishment-specific unobservable characteristics,
we present estimates of a fixed-effects specification which eliminates αi as well as φj
(see Abowd et al. 1999b). To remove αi+ φj, we first-difference eq. (8) within each
individual-establishment combination, also referred to as individual-establishment-
’spells’ (Andrews et al. 2005). Defining θs = αi + φj in eq. (8) as the unobserved
spell-level effect for spell s, first-differencing of eq. (8) yields:
∆ lnwit = β ·∆x′it + η ·∆w′jt +∆²ijt, (9)
where first-differencing within each spell sweeps out θs. From eq. (9) it becomes
clear that spell first-differencing eliminates time-constant individual characteristics
12For instance, only 331 out of 1,639 establishments are observed over a time-period of more
than 6 years, whereas only 179 plants are observed for more than 7 years.
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u′i as well as time-constant establishment variables q
′
j, so that the coefficient vectors δ
and ρ cannot be identified. For this reason, it is common to subsume observable time-
constant and unobservable attributes into one single individual- and establishment
effect, i.e. ϕi = δ · ui + αi as well as ϑj = ρ · qj + φj. Since previous research on
German wage determination has documented significant differences in the returns to
firm-specific attributes across different bargaining institutions (Stephan and Gerlach
2005, Guertzgen 2006), we include interactions between collective bargaining status
(firm-specific contract, industry contract) and some of the time-varying j−level
covariates, w′jt.
The Employment Statistics Register contains individual information on gross
daily wages, which are reported inclusive of fringe-benefits as long as such wage
supplements are subject to social security contributions. Since there is an upper
contribution limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are top-coded.
In our sample, top-coding affects 12.9 per cent of all observations. To address this
problem, we construct 54 cells based on education, gender and year. For each cell,
a Tobit regression is estimated with log daily wages as the dependent variable and
individual and establishment covariates as explanatory variables (see Table A4 in the
appendix). As described in Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are replaced
by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are
constructed by the predicted values from the Tobit regressions and whose (lower)
truncation point is given by the contribution limit to the social security system.
After this imputation procedure, nominal wages are deflated by the Consumer Price
Index of the Federal Statistical Office Germany normalised to 1 in 2000.
To estimate eq. (9), we exclude observations for apprentices and part time
workers from the worker data, because the Employment Statistics Register lacks
explicit information on hours worked. Moreover, we consider only those individuals
for whom the individual covariates reported in Table A4 and at least two consecutive
time series observations per spell are available. This reduces the estimation sample
to 659,784 individuals, yielding an unbalanced panel containing 2,525,188 individual
observations. Table A4 in the appendix reports individual-level descriptive statistics
as well as the estimates resulting from the fixed-effects specification. The figures
show that except for some of the educational variables all individual covariates enter
the specification with their expected sign and are significant at the 1% or 5%-level.
Moreover, from the establishment-level covariates the coefficients on establishment
size and per-capita value added are found to be significant at the 1% or 5%-level.
Similar to what has been found in earlier work (Guertzgen 2005, 2006) centralised
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contracts are associated with a significant lower responsiveness of wages to firm-
specific productivity conditions.13
After having estimated eq. (9), an estimator of the unobserved spell effect θs =
(ϕs + ϑs) is computed as follows:
θ̂s = lnws − β · xs − η · ws (10)
where variables with bars denote averages over all time-series observations within
each spell. We then calculate for each establishment and each year the mean and
the standard deviation of θ̂s. From these estimates we obtain a time-varying plant-
specific mean, θjt, standard deviation sd(θ)jt and coefficient of variation, CV (θ)jt of
θ̂s.
14 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the plant-specific mean and standard
deviation of θ̂ averaged over all establishment observations separately by bargaining
coverage and the existence of a works council. To obtain reasonable measures of
plant-specific wage dispersion, the descriptive statistics are restricted to plants with
at least 10 employees. The upper part of Table 1 shows that individuals in covered
plants are characterised by higher unobserved individual and plant-specific effects.
Moreover, the intra-plant dispersion of this unobserved wage component is smaller
in covered plants, which exhibit a smaller coefficient of variation of θ̂ than uncovered
establishments. Note that the smaller variability in θ̂ in covered establishments is
consistent with the view that in covered establishments observable and unobservable
individual characteristics are likely to be negatively correlated. The reason is that,
if collective contracts raise wages particularly for those with low observed skills
and tend to decrease wages for those with high observed skills by reducing the
returns to observable attributes, jobs in covered firms are particularly desirable for
observably low-skilled workers and less attractive for those with high observed skills.
As a result, employers have the incentive to hire the most productive workers from
those with low observed skills, whereas workers with high observed skills should
be negatively selected (see also Card 1996, Lemieux 2000). Finally, the last rows
indicate that similar results hold for the co-determination regimes. Works council
plants have, on average, a higher unobserved individual and plant-specific wage
component, which shows less within-plant dispersion compared with plants without
13We have also experimented with a specification including interaction terms between all of
the individual characteristics and collective bargaining status. However, the estimated interaction
coefficients turned out to be insignificant, so that we decided to employ the more parsimonious
specification reported below. Note that the insignificant interactions support the notion that
workers with low observable skills are positively selected and workers with high observable skills
are negatively selected into covered establishments (see Guertzgen 2006).
14In what follows, when referring to θjt, sd(θ)jt and CV (θ), we suppress the hat over θ for
expositional convenience.
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any works council. Overall, Table 1 therefore appears to support the notion that
labour market institutions that provide more stringent employment protection are
typically associated with less intra-plant residual wage dispersion.
Table 1: Residual wage dispersion by labour market institutions
θ sd(θ) CV (θ)
Collective bargaining
No coverage 4.185 0.240 0.058
Industry-level contract 4.243 0.236 0.056
Firm-level contract 4.289 0.248 0.055
Works council
Works council exists 4.278 0.223 0.052
No works council 4.189 0.248 0.060
Source: LIAB 1995-2004. The figures are weighted using the sample
weights and are restricted to establishments with at least 10 employees.
(1,411 establishments, 5,090 establishment observations).
5.4 Descriptive Evidence
5.4.1 Time-series features
Before we relate our measure of plant-specific residual wage dispersion to job and
worker reallocation, we begin by presenting some elementary features about gross
job and worker flows in our sample establishments. Table 2 shows annual rates of
job reallocation, worker reallocation and excess worker reallocation over the time pe-
riod 1996 to 2003. Even though we report weighted figures using the sample weights
from the IAB-Establishment Panel it has to be kept in mind that the figures are
unlikely to be representative as we confine our sample to establishments with at
least two consecutive time period observations. For comparison purposes, the last
column displays employment growth statistics reported by the German Federal Sta-
tistical Office for the western German mining and manufacturing industries. While
these offical statistics show that employment contracted by 1 per cent, our sample
establishments exhibit an average annual contraction rate of -0.8 per cent over the
sample period, indicating that our sample selection appears to be slightly in favour
of expanding establishments. The first noteworthy fact that emerges from Table 2
is that in all years there is simultaneous job creation and destruction. Even though
employment contracted over the sample period, there are job creation rates ranging
from 3.0 per cent in 2002/2003 to 4.8 per cent in 1999. Job destruction rates range
from 2.9 per cent in 2001 to 5.7 per cent in 1997. Over the whole period, gross job
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creation and destruction averaged 3.8 and 4.6 per cent respectively, indicating that
employers created 3.8 jobs per 100 workers and destroyed 4.6 jobs per 100 workers.
Worker reallocation averages a rate of about 24.2 per cent, suggesting that about
one in four matches either forms or breaks up each year. The average worker re-
allocation rate is almost three times as high as the average job reallocation rate,
suggesting that excess worker flows account for at least two thirds of total worker
flows. The upper bound on the worker flow rate required to accommodate shifts
in the distribution of employment positions across plants is 8.4 per cent, while the
lower bound is given by 4.6 per cent. These figures therefore indicate that about
one fifth to one third of total worker reallocation arises to accommodate job real-
location, suggesting that the reshuffling of job opportunities across plants accounts
for a substantial fraction of worker reallocation. It is interesting to note that this
proportion is remarkably similar to what has been found earlier in the literature for
other countries.15
Table 2: Time-series variation in job- and worker flows
Year JCR JDR JRR JGR ACCR SEPR WFR EXWFR Growth1)
All 0.038 0.046 0.084 -.008 0.117 0.125 0.242 0.158 -.010
1996 0.033 0.046 0.079 -.013 0.106 0.119 0.225 0.146 -.028
1997 0.033 0.057 0.089 -.024 0.106 0.130 0.236 0.147 -.019
1998 0.044 0.040 0.084 0.004 0.122 0.118 0.240 0.156 0.002
1999 0.048 0.051 0.099 -.003 0.128 0.131 0.259 0.160 -.010
2000 0.044 0.050 0.094 -.006 0.125 0.131 0.256 0.162 0.005
2001 0.046 0.029 0.076 0.017 0.141 0.123 0.264 0.188 0.001
2002 0.030 0.046 0.076 -.016 0.110 0.126 0.236 0.160 -.024
2003 0.030 0.050 0.080 -.020 0.102 0.122 0.225 0.145 -.028
ρ(X,JGR) 0.845 -.864 -.069 1.000 0.937 -.204 0.775 0.860
p−value 0.008 0.006 0.871 0.001 0.628 0.024 0.006
Source: LIAB 1995-2004. 1,639 establishments, 5,867 establishment observations.
Aggregate figures are calculated as described in Section 5.2 and are weighted
using the sample weights. 1)Employment growth in manufacturing, mining, electricity
and water supply as reported by the German Federal Statistical Office (Series 13311LJ003).
ρ(X, JGR) is the Pearson correlation between the variable X and JGR.
As far as the cyclical properties are concerned, the figures show that job creation
15For example, using (quarterly) Maryland administrative data Burgess et al. (2000) report a
worker flow rate of 19.4 per cent and a job reallocation rate of 7.4 per cent for the manufacturing
industries (1985-1994). Anderson and Mayer (l994) report accession rates and separations rates
three times as high as job creation and destructions rates for eight U.S. states over the period
1978-1984. Using Dutch annual firm-level data, a similar proportion of worker to job flows is found
by Hamermesh et al. (1996) for the years 1988 and 1990.
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is clearly procyclical, whereas job destruction is countercyclical (with significant sim-
ple correlation coefficients of about 0.85 and -0.86). Job reallocation does not exhibit
any cyclical behaviour, reflecting the fact that the procyclical and countercyclical
time variation of job creation and destruction are of a similar magnitude.16 For
worker reallocation and excess worker reallocation, in contrast, the figures provides
evidence of a significant procyclical behaviour. While the correlation coefficient
between worker flows and net job growth is 0.78 with a p-value below 0.05, the
correlation coefficient between excess worker flows and net job growth is 0.86 with
a p-value below 0.01. Note that the latter results are in line with what has been
found by other authors (e.g. Albaek and Soerensen 1998, Burgess et al. 2000). The
procyclical behaviour of excess worker reallocation is consistent with the view that
economic expansions increase the number of quits as workers find better paid jobs
elsewhere.17 This pattern underscores the importance of firm-specific wage polices
for worker flows. Finally, a closer look at the cyclical behaviour of separation and
accession rates reveals that accessions are procyclical and separations are counter-
cyclical. The correlations show that the procyclical pattern of worker reallocation
is largely driven by the procyclical variation in accession rates, indicating that em-
ployers reduce hirings in economic downturns instead of increasing separations. This
tendency of employers to rely on entry flows to adjust employment suggests that em-
ployment protection institutions should play an additional major role in determining
the extent of worker reallocation.
5.4.2 Cross-sectional features
This section sets out some of the basic features of the cross-sectional variation in job
and worker reallocation rates. Table A5 in the appendix displays job and worker flow
rates cross-tabulated by two-digit industries, size classes as well as establishment age
classes. All figures are size-weighted averages of the eight annual values. The upper
panel of Table A5 shows that employment in our sample establishments contracted in
11 sectors of the 16 two-digit industries over the sample period, ranging from 0.2 per
cent in Basic Metals to 6.2 per cent in Textiles. Despite these net contractions each
of these two-digit industry experienced gross job creation, ranging from 2.4 per cent
in Chemicals to 5.3 per cent in Optical Equipment. Conversely, of those industries
16This stands in contrast to the results by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Konings (1995) and
Burgess et al. (2000) who report a countercyclical behaviour of gross job flows. However, the
often asserted empirical regularity of countercyclical gross job flows has been contended by some
authors, such as Boeri (1996), Albaek and Soerensen (1998) as well as Gielen and van Ours (2006).
17In particular, this result runs counter to the hypothesis put forward by Burda and Wyplosz
(1994) that excess worker reallocation exhibits a countercyclical pattern due to plants restructuring
their labour force in recessions.
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that grew over the sample period, each of the expanding sectors experienced gross
job destruction, ranging from 2.1 per cent in Transport Equipment to 6.2 per cent
in Wood Products. The annual average job and worker reallocation rate shows
considerable cross-industry variation, with job reallocation rates ranging from 5.2
per cent in Motor Vehicles to 13.6 per cent in Wood Products and excess worker
flow rates ranging from 11.8 per cent in Motor Vehicles to 23.3 per cent in Food,
Beverages and Tobacco.
The second panel of Table A5 shows that job reallocation is consistently higher
in smaller establishments, ranging from 2.6 per cent in very large plants to 14.8
per cent in plants with less than 50 employees. The same is true for worker and
excess worker flows, which also decline sharply with establishment size. Similar to
what has been found in other studies, job reallocation rates are found to be larger
in younger plants. However, this appears to be mainly driven by higher job creation
rates, as job destruction rates are of a similar magnitude. Thus, theories based upon
selection effects associated with passive learning about initial conditions in the spirit
of Jovanovic (1982) do not receive much support by this pattern. Finally, worker
and excess worker flows also decrease with establishment age, indicating that factors
contributing to match re-evaluation vary across younger and more mature plants.
Table 3: Institutional variation in job- and worker flows
A. Dispersion θ JCR JDR JRR JGR ACCR SEPR WFR EXWFR
1. quartile CV (θ) 0.041 0.040 0.081 0.001 0.111 0.110 0.221 0.140
2. quartile CV (θ) 0.026 0.036 0.062 -.010 0.103 0.093 0.196 0.134
3. quartile CV (θ) 0.032 0.040 0.072 -.008 0.112 0.120 0.232 0.160
4. quartile CV (θ) 0.038 0.052 0.090 -.014 0.131 0.145 0.276 0.186
B. Coverage
Industry-level contract 0.030 0.043 0.073 -.013 0.104 0.117 0.221 0.147
Firm-level contract 0.028 0.039 0.067 -.011 0.097 0.108 0.205 0.138
No coverage 0.056 0.036 0.092 0.020 0.151 0.131 0.282 0.190
C. Works council
Works council exists 0.029 0.043 0.072 -.014 0.099 0.113 0.212 0.140
No works council 0.056 0.037 0.093 0.019 0.158 0.139 0.298 0.205
Source: LIAB 1995-2004. Aggregate figures are calculated as described in Section 5.2 and
are weighted using the sample weights. The figures are restricted to establishments with at least
10 employees.
The preceding descriptive statistics indicate that there is considerable variation
in the amount of job and worker reallocation, even within quite narrowly defined
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industries and size classes. This variation provides strong motivation for an inquiry
into the underlying sources of the establishment-level heterogeneity. To assess the
potential role of firm-specific wage policies, Table 3 displays job and worker flow
rates cross-tabulated by different wage policies and labour market institutions. In
Panel A, establishments are ranked according to their coefficient of variation of θ,
CV (θ). The figures show that job destruction is found to be largest in the last
quartile of the distribution of CV (θ). Plants falling into the first and last quartile
of the distribution of CV (θ) exhibit significant higher job creation rates than those
falling into the second and third quartile, indicating a U-shaped relationship between
wage flexibility and job creation rates. These observations are clearly at variance
with our expectation that more flexible wages should reduce the extent of gross job
flows. Instead, they suggest that there may be other factors that interfere with more
flexible wage polices. In fact, Panel B and C show that uncovered plants and those
without a works council, which typically feature a less compressed wage structure,
exhibit larger job creation and reallocation rates, suggesting that the effect of less
stringent hiring and firing regulations and more flexible wages are likely to offset
each other.
While the relationship between job reallocation and the intra-plant dispersion
of θ does not reveal any straightforward pattern, the association between excess
worker reallocation and CV (θ) appears to be more clear-cut. Closer inspection of
the rightmost column in Panel A of Table 3 shows that excess worker reallocation
is higher in plants falling into the upper two quartiles of the distribution of CV (θ).
In this context, it is interesting to note that according to Panel B and C excess
worker reallocation rates are considerably smaller in covered plants and in those
plants with a works council, i.e. in those plants exhibiting more compressed wage
policies. This raises the question as to how the established relationships between
worker flows and wage flexibility holds if one controls for the existence of collective
bargaining contracts and the existence of a works council. These questions will be
subsequently addressed in a multivariate regression framework.
5.5 Multivariate Results
In this section, we present the results from the multivariate regression analysis. In
the regressions, establishment-specific job and worker flow rates are explained by
our measures of firm-specific wage flexibility, as detailed in Section 5.3, and a set of
additional control variables. To obtain reasonable measures of plant-specific wage
dispersion, we restrict the multivariate analysis to plants with at least 10 employees.
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Moreover, as we include lagged explanatory variables such as lagged growth in value
added, we keep only those plants with at least three consecutive time-series observa-
tions. This reduces the sample to 927 establishments with 3,205 observations. Table
A3 in the appendix compares summary statistics of the restricted sample with those
of the original sample.
As the job and worker flow rates are restricted to the interval [0;2], the results
are based upon estimates from a Tobit model. A further important concern is
that our measures of firm specific wage policies, CV (θ) and θ, are likely to be
endogenous. A natural source of bias is a standard simultaneity bias which occurs if
employment and wages are jointly determined. Note that this is particularly relevant
for the association between job reallocation and the mean value of θ, if, for example,
expanding firms pay more on average in order to attract or retain workers. This
is supported by the evidence provided by Belzil (2000) who finds that job creation
positively affects individual wages whereas worker reallocation appears to have no
systematic impact on wages. Second, the extent of job and worker reallocation may
also have a direct impact upon the distribution wages, if, for example, the extent to
which demand shocks affect wages varies across the intra-plant wage distribution.
To address this problem, we include lagged values of CV (θ) and θ as explanatory
variables in our regressions. However, we are aware that this may not fully rule
out the endogeneity problem particularly in the presence of correlated shocks or if
future shocks are anticipated in wage determination.
Table 4 reports the results of running a series of Tobit regressions of the plant-
specific values of JDR and JCR on CV (θ) and θ and a set of additional controls.
Column (1) in the left panel includes industry and time dummies as well as lagged
values of CV (θ) and θ as explanatory variables for job creation. In column (1),
CV (θ) enters the equation with an unexpected positive sign and is found to be in-
significant. In column (2), we add institutional characteristics, such as the existence
of a works council and a collective bargaining contract to the equation. The results
indicate that compared with uncovered establishments covered plants and those
with a works council experience significantly lower job creation rates. Even though
the inclusion of institutional characteristics leads to a decrease in the coefficient on
CV (θ), its coefficient remains positive and insignificant. Note that the decrease in
the coefficient on CV (θ) captures the negative association between our plant-specific
labour market institutions and wage dispersion. Column (3) includes as further ex-
planatory variables average worker characteristics, lagged establishment size as well
as a dummy for establishment age and multi-establishment employers. The inclu-
sion of these covariates leads again to an increase in the estimated coefficient. The
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results suggest that establishments with an older and more tenured workforce in
particular experience significantly less job creation. From the remaining covariates,
only the share of apprentices and part time workers and the plant-age dummy are
found to be significant at conventional levels.
Overall, the results indicate that establishments with more flexible wages do
not appear to experience significantly less job creation. As a result, the Bertola-
Rogerson hypothesis does not receive much support by this evidence. To provide
a more direct test of this hypothesis, we further add the lagged growth of total
value added as a proxy for demand shocks as well as its interaction with CV (θ) to
the equation. Given that with more flexible wages demand shocks are less likely
to be absorbed by employment rather than by wage adjustments, one might ex-
pect a positive coefficient on value added growth as well as a negative coefficient on
the interaction term. The results are presented in column (4). Interestingly, even
though the interaction term is only weakly significant and the coefficient on value
added growth borders significance (with a p−value of 0.11), both variables enter the
equation with their expected sign. Overall, these results argue against the view that
there is no empirical support for the Bertola-Rogerson hypothesis. Instead, they
suggest that even though establishments with a more flexible wage structure gen-
erally experience more employment growth, wage dispersion may have a significant
negative impact on job creation arising primarily from the absorption of positive
shocks by wage adjustments.
To investigate the relationship between wage flexibility and negative job growth
rates, the right panel of Table 4 presents the results with the job destruction rate as
the dependent variable. The estimates indicate that after controlling for different
subsets of plant characteristics, establishments with more flexible wages experience
significantly less job destruction. The results suggest that job destruction declines
with the share of part time workers, while it increases with the share of female
workers and apprentices. Note that the negative association between the fraction
of part time workers and job destruction appears to reflect employers’ increased
flexibility in the use of labour. Further, establishments with an older and more
tenured workforce experience significantly larger job destruction rates. In column
(4), even though the coefficients on lagged value added growth and its interaction
with CV (θ) are estimated fairly imprecisely, they enter the equation with their
expected sign.
In sum, the picture that emerges from Table 4 is that higher wage dispersion
produces lower negative and higher positive growth rates, suggesting a positive re-
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lationship between residual wage dispersion and overall establishment growth, but
no significant association with job reallocation. The inclusion of lagged value added
and its interaction with CV (θ) strongly supports the view that a negative impact
of wage dispersion on job reallocation primarily arises from absorbing shocks by
wage adjustments. To assess the overall impact of CV (θ), it is useful to compute
the marginal effect of CV (θ) conditional on positive job creation and destruction
rates.18 For the job creation rate, the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of
the covariates conditional on positive value added growth in t − 1 is about 0.15,
suggesting that the overall effect is still positive even for those establishments that
experience a positive demand shock. In the job destruction equation, the marginal
effect of CV (θ) conditional on negative value added growth in t− 1 is about -0.41.
Given the descriptive statistics in Table 1 this implies that a one standard devia-
tion increase in CV (θ) decreases the job destruction rate by roughly 0.8 percentage
points. According to the mean values of job destruction reported in Table 2 this is
a non-negligible change.
To explore the role of residual wage dispersion for worker flows, Table 5 shows
the results of running the corresponding regressions with ACCR and SEPR as the
dependent variables. When interpreting these results, it is helpful to place the results
in Table 5 alongside the results in Table 4. In particular, it has to be kept in mind
that worker flows may be decomposed into those flows that directly result from job
flows and into excess worker flows. A comparison of the estimates therefore suggests
that significant covariates in the job flow regressions that are not significantly related
to worker flows or even reverse their sign ought to have a reverse effect on excess
worker flows. The left panel of Table 5 shows the results for the accession regressions:
The estimates in column (4) show that similar to the job creation regressions the
coefficient on CV (θ) is estimated to be positive, but turns out to be insignificant at
conventional levels.
18The marginal effect of CV (θ) conditional on a positive value of y is given by: ∂E(y|x,y>0)CV (θ) =
(βCV (θ)+βCV (θ) V A GrV A Grt−1){1−λ(xβσ )[xβσ +λ(xβσ )]}, where λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio.
See e.g. Wooldridge (2002), Chapter 16.
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In the separation equation, in contrast, we do find a reverse effect of CV (θ) on
worker flows as compared with the job flow regressions. While the results in Table
4 suggested a significant negative association between job destruction and CV (θ),
the coefficient on CV (θ) is found to be insignificant in column (4) in the separation
regressions. This finding is indicative of a positive effect on excess separations.
In column (1), CV (θ) even enters the equation with a positive sign. However,
including institutional characteristics in column (2) as well as further establishment
characteristics in column (3) renders the coefficient insignificant and reverses its
sign. The decrease in the coefficient on CV (θ) in column (2) shows that differences in
plant-specific labour market institutions account for parts of the positive association
between separation rates and residual wage dispersion. In column (4), contrary to
the job destruction equations, the coefficient on the lagged value added growth
is estimated to be positive. Given that this variable entered the job destruction
equation with a negative sign, this is indicative of a positive effect on excess worker
flows.
The latter conjecture is confirmed by the estimates in Table 6, which presents
the regression results for excess worker flows. The coefficient on value added growth
shows that positive demand shocks are associated with a significant increase in excess
worker reallocation. A possible interpretation suggested by Burgess et al. (2000)
is that positive shocks that tend to give rise to more job creation may increase the
possibility for subsequent mismatches, thereby increasing the extent of excess worker
reallocation. The coefficient on CV (θ) confirms the results of Table 5 that plants
with a larger degree of residual wage dispersion experience significantly larger excess
worker reallocation. However, the coefficient on the interaction term with value
added growth indicates that a larger degree of residual wage dispersion also has a
negative impact on excess worker flows by reducing its response to positive demand
shocks. The intuition here is that the response of job creation and subsequent excess
worker reallocation to demand shocks decreases with a more flexible wage structure.
As to the remaining covariates, in Section 4 it has been shown that even though
the existence of collective bargaining contracts may play a certain role in employment
protection, the greatest effect may be expected from works councils either through
their direct co-determination rights or via their collective voice function. Note that
this idea is borne out by our estimates. The results show that the coefficient on
works councils is estimated to be negative and highly significant, whereas the coeffi-
cients on collective bargaining contracts are found to be insignificant. The estimates
further indicate that establishments with an older and more tenured labour force
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experience significantly lower excess worker reallocation. This may reflect the fact
that hiring and firing restrictions impose costs on the employer that increase in gen-
eral with age and tenure. For this reason, employers have an incentive to dissolve
bad matches in early stages of an employment relationship. The negative associa-
tion between excess worker reallocation and tenure is also consistent with theories
that stress the acquisition of firm-specific human capital (e.g. Parsons 1972), since
the accumulation of such firm-specific skills increases the costs of dissolving a match
for both the employer and the employee. Interestingly, the fraction of high-skilled
workers is found to be positively related to excess worker reallocation. Given that
for this group excess turnover costs are likely to be particularly relevant, this result
may be interpreted as evidence that the degree of mobility varies greatly among
different skill groups. Further, the coefficient on the share of female workers and ap-
prentices is also positive and significant, which is consistent with the view that these
groups are likely to have less stable employment relationships. A further interesting
finding that emerges from the excess worker flow regression is that, similar to the job
and worker flow results, the coefficient on the average residual wage, θt−1, is found
to be insignificant, although θt−1 enters the equation with its expected sign. Note
that this stands in contrast to previous findings from the literature (e.g. Burgess
et al. 2000, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 2003) and may largely be attributed to our
control for other plant characteristics.
Taken together, the picture that emerges from Table 6 is that the overall effect of
higher residual wage dispersion on excess worker reallocation is ambiguous. While a
more flexible wage structure leads to an increase in the level of excess worker flows,
it simultaneously reduces the amount of job creation and subsequent excess worker
reallocation in response to recent demand shocks. Given these two countervailing
effects, it is instructive to compute the overall marginal effect of CV (θ) on excess
worker flow rates. Evaluating the marginal effect at the sample mean of lagged value
added growth gives a value of 0.47, suggesting that the net effect is positive. Along
with the descriptive statistics in Table 1 this result implies that a one standard
deviation increase in CV (θ) raises the excess worker reallocation rate by about 1
percentage point.
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The established positive relationship suggests that the positive association be-
tween residual wage dispersion and excess hiring as well as between excess separa-
tions of those workers who a bad matches dominates a potential negative relation-
ship between wage dispersion and excess separations of good matches. To explore
whether the relationship between wage dispersion and excess reallocation varies with
the quality of the match, we proceed as in Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003). Based
on the notion that the residual wage component, θ, may serve as a proxy for the
quality of the match, we rank workers in terms of quartiles of the plant-specific
distribution of θ. Doing so allows us to compute excess worker reallocation rates
for each of the quartile groups within each establishment and to run the regressions
separately for each quartile.19
The results from these quartile-specific regressions are reported in column (2) to
(5) of Table 6. Even though we fail to detect a monotonically decreasing relation-
ship between CV (θ) and excess worker reallocation, the results indicate that the
association appears to be most pronounced for the lowest quartile. For the highest
quartile we obtain the smallest estimate for the coefficient on CV (θ), which turns
out to be insignificant. This finding lends strong support to the hypothesis that
a larger degree of residual wage dispersion may have ambiguous effects on excess
worker reallocation of good matches as flexible wages may help employers to retain
good matches, thereby decreasing the extent of excess separations of high-quality
workers.
In a final step, we look at the interactions between wage flexibility and the degree
of employment protection. Our earlier considerations suggested that a more flexible
wage structure might give rise to more excess separations of bad matches since
flexible wages do allow firms to dissolve these employment relationships by lowering
wages. In a similar vein, it has been argued that flexible wages should lead to more
excess accessions as employers become less selective to whom they hire. Clearly,
these mechanisms should be the more relevant the more stringent firing regulations
are. The reason for this is twofold: First, with low employment protection employers
do not have to rely on wage cuts to dissolve bad matches. Second, the extent to
which a compressed wage structure reduces excess accessions is likely to be the larger
the more expensive it is to terminate a bad match. To test the hypothesis that
19To do so, we proceed as follows. A worker separation within a particular quartile at time t
is an employment relationship observed at t − 1, but not in period t based upon the quartiles of
the plant distribution of θ in t − 1. A worker accession in period t is defined as an employment
relationship which is observed in period t but not in year t − 1 based upon the quartiles of the
plant distribution of θ in t− 1.
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the positive effect of residual wage dispersion varies with the degree of employment
protection, we additionally included interaction terms between CV (θ) and our plant-
specific labour market institutions. Surprisingly, none of these interaction terms
turned out to be insignificant, and for the sake of expositional brevity the results
are not reported here. A possible explanation for this finding may relate to the fact
that our estimation sample is confined to establishments with at least 10 employees,
which are all subject to the German Protection against Dismissal Act (see Section
4.1). This may have the consequence that our sample establishments do not exhibit
sufficient institutional variation in firing practices, making it impossible to identify
a significant interaction effect. To obtain somewhat more institutional variation
in employment protection, we extended our estimation sample to establishments
with at least 5 employees. Even though this extension raises the problem of a
quite imprecise estimate of the residual wage dispersion, it provides us with the
opportunity of observing plants to which the Protection against Dismissal Act did
not apply during the time period October1996 to January 1999. Note that the annual
flows that are likely to be affected by this legislation change are those between 1997
and 1998, as the amendment in October 1996 became immediately effective only
for newly hired workers. We therefore constructed two dummy variables taking
on the value of unity if an establishment employs less than 10 employees, one for
the year 1998 and one for the remaining observation period. The results from
including an interaction term between these two dummy variables and CV (θ) are
displayed in column (6). The coefficients on the interaction terms indicate that the
association between residual wage dispersion and worker reallocation turns out to
be significantly lower in establishments with less than 10 employees. Moreover, the
differential effect is particularly large for the year 1998 when small establishments
with more than 5 and less than 10 employees had been exempted from the Protection
against Dismissal Act. This finding strongly supports the notion that less stringent
firing practices may substantially decrease the need for more flexible wages in order
to attain optimal worker-firm matches.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Drawing on a large-scale Linked Employer-Employee data set, this paper provides
evidence on the role of employers’ wage policies for job and worker reallocation in
western German manufacturing. A key aspect of our study is that we attempt to
control for further plant-specific characteristics that may be expected to affect both
wages and employment adjustment. Particular emphasis is given to plant-specific
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labour market institutions, such as the existence of a works council and a collective
wage contract, since these institutions are typically associated with more stringent
employment protection and less flexible wages. Using the plant-specific dispersion
of residual wages as a proxy for wage flexibility confirms this notion, since we find
covered plants and those with a works council to be characterised by less intra-plant
wage dispersion.
Our results may be summarised as follows: We document a negative association
between plant-specific job destruction rates and residual wage dispersion, whereas
job creation rates are found to be positively related to wage dispersion. However,
in interacting our measure of wage flexibility with a proxy for demand shocks, we
find that with more flexible wages demand shocks are more likely to be absorbed
by wage rather than by quantity adjustments. Overall, these findings therefore lend
strong support to the Bertola-Rogerson hypothesis. The results further indicate
that accounting for plant-specific labour market institutions leads to a decline in
the positive association between wage dispersion and job creation, as plants with a
firm-level contract and a works council exhibit significantly less job creation. This
result is consistent with the Bertola-Rogerson view of countervailing effects of labour
market institutions that are associated with more stringent employment protection
and a larger degree of wage compression. However, this appears to be true only
for job creation, since we fail to detect any significant association between labour
market institutions and job destruction rates. At least for job destruction rates, the
evidence presented here documents not only a statistically, but also an economically
significant impact of employer-specific wage policies: an increase in the plant-specific
coefficient of variation of one standard deviation decreases the job destruction rate
by about 0.8 percentage points, which is non-negligible given that both job creation
and destruction average rates of about 4.6 per cent over the sample period.
As to excess worker reallocation, our results provide evidence of a positive re-
lationship between excess worker flows and residual wage dispersion. This finding
suggests that the positive association between wage dispersion and excess separa-
tions of bad matches dominates the negative relationship between residual wage
dispersion and excess separations of good matches. The established positive rela-
tionship is robust to the inclusion of plant-specific labour market institutions, which
are typically found to be negatively related to excess worker flows. Further, the
quartile-specific regressions indicate that the positive association between excess
worker reallocation and wage dispersion is significantly lower in the highest quar-
tiles of the residual wage distribution. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
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a higher degree of wage flexibility may have an offsetting impact on excess worker
turnover of higher quality worker by decreasing excess separations. We find that an
increase in the plant-specific coefficient of variation of one standard deviation raises
excess worker reallocation by about 1 percentage point. Given that excess worker
reallocation averages a rate of about 16 per cent over the period under consideration,
this finding suggests that the economic importance of wage policies for excess worker
reallocation is somewhat smaller in magnitude as compared with job destruction.
Our results have strong welfare implications with respect to the role of wage
flexibility for labour market dynamics. In finding a negative association between
residual wage dispersion and job reallocation our findings suggest that a compressed
wage structure may lead to unduly unstable employment relationships as it pre-
vents shocks from being absorbed by wage adjustments. However, it should also
be noted that flexible wages may impose constraints on the expansion of successful
firms if positive shocks are absorbed by wage instead of employment increases. The
established association between residual wage dispersion and excess worker flows, in
contrast, suggests that a compressed wage structure may reduce employers’ ability
to achieve or sustain optimal worker-firm matches. In establishing the result that
increased wage flexibility matters the more the more stringent firing regulations are,
our findings suggest that more flexible wages and less stringent employment pro-
tection may be viewed as substitutes in helping firms to achieve optimal matches.
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A Appendix
Variable Definition
Value added Value added is constructed by subtracting material costs from annual
sales. Per-capita values are obtained by dividing by average establishment
size (Size). The latter is calculated by averaging the number of employees
for the month June over the present and preceding year.
Nominal values are deflated by the sector-specific producer
price index obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office, which
is merged to the data based upon a two-digit sector classification.
K/L Constructed by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the
Capital-labour ratio capital value in the first observation year and using the information on
expansion investments. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing
investment expenditures in each establishment’s first observation year
by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g, and a depreciation rate
of capital, d .*) Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by
adding real expansion investment expenditures. Nominal investment
expenditures are deflated by the producer price index of investment goods
of the Federal Statistical Office Germany. The capital-labour ratio is con-
structed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment size.
Works council Dummy=1 if works council is present. In some years (1995 and 1997)
only those plants who enter the panel are asked to report the existence
of a works council. For the remaining establishments the missing
information is imputed based upon the information in the following year.
Firm-level contract Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by a firm-specific agreement.
Industry-level contract Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by an industry-specific agreement.
Young Dummy=1 if establishment was founded in 1990 or later.
Multi-establishment Dummy=1 if establishment belongs to a multi-plant enterprise.
Note: *) To calculate the capital stock in the first period, we set d=0.1 and g=0.05.
Table A1: Construction of establishment variables from the IAB-Establishment Panel
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Variable Definition
Share of female workers Number of female workers divided by number of employees (the latter
defined as the number of employment spells comprising June 30th)
Share of part time workers Number of part time workers divided by number of employees
Share of apprentices Number of apprentices divided by number of employees
Share of skilled workers Number of employees with vocational (Vocational Degree = 1) and
vocational-plus- high school degree (Voc-High=1)
divided by the number of employees
Share of high-skilled Number of employees with technical college (Technical University = 1)
or university degree (University = 1) divided by the number of employees
Median age Median of age of all employees with an employment spell
comprising the 30th June
Median tenure Median of tenure in months of all employees with an employment spell
comprising the 30th June
Table A2: Description of individual characteristics and establishment means
of individual characteristics gained from the Employment Statistics Register
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Original Sample Final Sample
Variables Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
CV (θ) 0.058 0.034 0.056 0.019
θ 4.139 0.291 4.229 0.229
Works council 0.201 — 0.457 —
Industry-level contract 0.556 — 0.606 —
Firm-level contract 0.058 — 0.092 —
Share female workers 0.289 0.269 0.241 0.205
Share apprentices 0.064 0.113 0.040 0.056
Share part time 0.085 0.135 0.055 0.070
Share skilled workers 0.769 0.232 0.739 0.200
Share high-skilled 0.030 0.079 0.043 0.070
Median age (years) 38.318 7.116 39.692 4.767
Median tenure (months) 82.560 55.737 93.940 51.981
Multi-establishment 0.192 — 0.297 —
Young 0.239 — 0.212 —
Employee 45.162 254.335 104.791 412.000
K/L 4.148 31.676 9.515 53.726
Value added growth∗) 0.149 2.732 0.221 4.381
Observations (Plants) 5,867 (1,639) 3,205 (927)
The final sample includes establishment with at least 10 employees
and at least 3 time-series observations. Figure are weighted using the
sample weights.∗)Note: Growth in total value added. Capital-labour
ratio is measured in DM 100,000. 1 e is DM 1.95583.
Table A3: Establishment Statistics
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FIXED-EFFECTS RESULTS
VARIABLE Mean Std.-Dev. VARIABLE Coeff. Std.-Err.
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
log(Wage) 5.29 (0.31) ∆log(Wage)
Female 0.17 —
Age (years) 40.80 (10.13) ∆Age 0.029∗∗∗ (0.009)
∆Age2 -.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Tenure (months) 142.86 (95.39) ∆Tenure 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
∆Tenure2 -.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Foreign 0.11 —
White-collar 0.40 — ∆White-collar 0.058∗∗∗ (0.007)
Vocational degree 0.65 — ∆Vocational degree 0.014 (0.007)
High school 0.01 — ∆High school -.019 (0.034)
Voc-High 0.03 — ∆Voc-High 0.026∗∗∗ (0.009)
Technical University 0.06 — ∆Technical University 0.117∗∗∗ (0.016)
University 0.06 — ∆University 0.128∗∗∗ (0.016)
ESTABLISHMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Size 4,454.32 (6,682,12) ∆ log(Size) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.007)
Value added∗) 1.97 (1.62) ∆ log(Value added) 0.011∗∗ (0.005)
Works council 0.96 (0.17) ∆ log(Value added)×Industry-level -.020∗∗∗ (0.008)
Industry-level contract 0.85 — ∆ log(Value added)×Firm-level 0.003 (0.008)
Firm-level contract 0.10 — ∆Works council 0.007 (0.007)
K/L 1.78 (4.11) ∆Works council×Industry-level 0.100 (0.100)
Young 0.08 — ∆Works council×Firm-level 0.045∗∗∗ (0.017)
Multi-establishment 0.70 — ∆Industry-level contract -.002 (0.003)
∆Firm-level contract -.007 (0.005)
∆K/L 0.000 (0.000)
Source: LIAB 1995-2004. 659,784 individuals, 1,639 establishments, 2,525,188 observations. Descriptive
statistics are non-weighted. ∗)Note: Measured as per-capita value added. Per-capita value added and
capital-labour ratio are measured in DM 100,000, whereby 1 e is DM 1.95583.
The fixed-effects specification includes 1,857,729 differenced observations and 6 time dummies.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level.
Table A4: Descriptive Statistics and Fixed-Effects Regression Results
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A. Two-Digit Industry JCR JDR JRR JGR ACCR SEPR WFR EXWFR
Mining, energy, water supply 0.032 0.045 0.077 -.013 0.095 0.108 0.203 0.126
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.046 0.038 0.084 0.008 0.163 0.154 0.317 0.233
Textiles and leather 0.027 0.089 0.116 -.062 0.121 0.183 0.304 0.188
Pulp, paper, publishing 0.029 0.048 0.077 -.019 0.122 0.103 0.225 0.148
Wood (excluding furniture) 0.074 0.062 0.136 0.013 0.172 0.160 0.332 0.196
Chemicals, coke, petroleum 0.024 0.043 0.067 -.019 0.100 0.118 0.218 0.151
Rubber and plastic products 0.045 0.051 0.096 -.006 0.137 0.143 0.280 0.184
Non-metallic mineral products 0.039 0.045 0.084 -.006 0.130 0.136 0.266 0.182
Basic metals 0.035 0.037 0.072 -.002 0.104 0.106 0.210 0.138
Fabricated metals 0.047 0.043 0.090 0.003 0.128 0.125 0.253 0.163
Machinery 0.038 0.048 0.086 -.010 0.111 0.121 0.232 0.146
Motor vehicles 0.025 0.027 0.052 -.002 0.084 0.086 0.170 0.118
Other transport equipment 0.037 0.021 0.058 0.016 0.106 0.090 0.196 0.138
Electrical equipment 0.039 0.055 0.094 -.016 0.118 0.133 0.251 0.157
Optical equipment 0.053 0.056 0.109 -.003 0.141 0.144 0.285 0.176
Furniture, N.E.C. 0.043 0.037 0.080 0.006 0.132 0.126 0.258 0.178
B. Size class
1-50 0.067 0.080 0.147 -.013 0.167 0.180 0.347 0.200
50-100 0.033 0.047 0.080 -.014 0.116 0.130 0.246 0.166
100-200 0.048 0.045 0.093 0.003 0.128 0.125 0.253 0.160
200-500 0.033 0.037 0.070 -.004 0.112 0.116 0.228 0.158
500-1000 0.023 0.041 0.065 -.018 0.108 0.090 0.198 0.133
1000-2000 0.028 0.029 0.057 -.001 0.094 0.095 0.189 0.132
2000-5000 0.018 0.027 0.044 -.009 0.081 0.090 0.171 0.127
5000-10000 0.024 0.020 0.044 0.004 0.089 0.085 0.174 0.130
10000+ 0.005 0.021 0.026 -.015 0.066 0.081 0.147 0.121
C. Age
Founded before 1990 0.035 0.046 0.081 -.011 0.113 0.124 0.237 0.156
Founded after 1990 0.057 0.048 0.105 0.009 0.143 0.134 0.277 0.172
Source: LIAB 1995-2004. Aggregate figures are calculated as described in Section 5.2 and are
weighted using the sample weights.
Table A5: Cross-sectional variation in job and worker flows
46
